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Conceptualising Party-Driven Movements 
 
Abstract: 
 
This article contributes to scholarship on the relationship between political parties and 
social movements by proposing a new model of ‘party-driven movements’ to 
understand the formation of a new hybrid model within existing political parties in 
majoritarian systems. In our two case studies – Momentum’s relationship with the UK 
Labour Party and the Bernie Sanders-inspired ‘Our Revolution’ with the US 
Democratic Party – we highlight the conditions under which they emerge and their 
key characteristics. We analyse how party-driven movements express an ambivalence 
in terms of strategy (working inside and outside the party), political aims (aiming to 
transform the party and society) and organisation (in the desire to maintain autonomy 
whilst participating within party structures). Our analysis suggests that such party-
driven movements provide a potential answer to political parties’ alienation from civil 
society and may thus be a more enduring feature of Anglo-American majoritarian 
party systems than the current literature suggests. 
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Introduction 
 
An important body of literature seeks to bridge the divide between the study of 
political parties and social movements, examining the interface between the two 
(Kruszewska, 2016; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010; Schwartz, 2010; Kitschelt, 1993). 
Recently, Donatella della Porta and colleagues (2017) have analysed new ‘movement-
parties’, hybrids which have emerged from left-wing, anti-austerity movements and 
shaken up the party system in Greece, Italy and Spain. The prospect of a similar 
development in majoritarian, two-party dominated systems like the United Kingdom 
and the United States, is far less likely. Indeed historically, a more fruitful strategy for 
movements in these systems has been to form mutually beneficial relationships with 
existing party organisations (Schlozman 2015). 
 
In this article, we argue that the differing dynamics of two-party systems has resulted 
in the appearance within existing parties of an alternative form of hybrid organisation, 
which we call ‘party-driven movements’. We aim to provide a conceptual framework 
for understanding the emergence of this new organisational hybrid. Two questions 
guide our research: first, under what specific conditions do party-driven movements 
emerge? Second, what are their key features and to what extent are they are 
distinctive kind of organisation?  
 
On this basis, we aim to advance the literature along two lines. First, rather than social 
movements that have evolved into parties, our two case studies represent movements 
that have emerged from the party itself: initiated by internal actors who co-opt 
existing networks of movement actors to create a movement-wing. Thus, rather than 
movements adopting more formal organisational structures and methods of political 
contestation, we seek to explain how, in this process, parties have adopted certain 
aspects of movement organising, whilst at the same time maintaining many of the 
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traditional structures and functions of political parties that underpin success in 
parliamentary politics. 
 
Second, we turn attention from continental European multi-party systems to Anglo-
American two-party systems. We claim that there are specific factors in the 
emergence of party-driven movements that are more evident in two-party systems. 
They may, furthermore, represent an attempt by party actors to reforge the links with 
civil society undone by professionalisation and centralisation (Mair 2013), and which 
have inspired attempts to restructure them (Yishai, 2001), or to explore alternative 
representative vehicles (Dommett and Rye, 2018).  
 
Sometimes this process is initiated by party leaders, such as Obama’s community 
organising initiative, ‘Organising for America,’ and Labour’s past experiments with 
similar techniques (Geary and Pabst, 2015). However, in contrast, our two case 
studies concern movements that emerged in opposition to mainstream party leaders, 
articulating dissatisfaction with the failure of party elites to adequately represent 
members’ interests and political goals. At the same time, they appeal beyond current 
members to disillusioned former members and participants in social movements who 
have never been members before. 
 
In each case, a window of political opportunity was opened by a sudden upsurge of 
energy in support of a candidate and a policy agenda. Forming a movement was a 
means by which actors within the party, could harness it to serve longer-term left-
wing goals, drawing in new support from new, non-traditional sources. This party-
movement dynamic, we argue, is the basis of a potentially transformative relationship, 
producing a new kind of organisation.   
 
We argue that this latest evolution in political party organisation is one avenue 
through which political parties could seek to reconnect with civil society. While at 
this stage it is not clear the extent to which this hybrid model could spread to other 
political systems, our analysis suggests that it’s most fertile ground appears to be in 
majoritarian two-party systems. The successes of Momentum and Our Revolution as 
organisations capable of mobilising supporters shows clear potential, although these 
movements have as yet not demonstrated clear payoffs with national electoral 
victories. 
 
 
Structure of the Article 
After exploring existing literature on the topic, we proceed by examining four key 
conditions for the emergence of party-driven movements, i) unrepresented claims ii) 
pre-existing social movement networks iii) political opportunity structures; and, iv) 
leadership. We then identify from our case studies four shared characteristics which 
illuminate the distinctiveness of the party-driven movement: i) insider/outsider status 
ii) the nature of its agenda iii) independence/autonomy; and, iv) digital organising.  
 
The material we analyse comes largely from Our Revolution and Momentum 
themselves, including publicity material, web-pages, newsletters and general 
information available online and offline, similar to an ‘official story’ approach to 
gathering data on political organisations (Poguntke et al., 2016). This has been 
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supplemented with material from external sources, such as news publications as well 
as existing scholarship on the two organisations. 
 
 
Social Movements and Political Parties 
 
Scholars interested in political parties have tended to view social movements as 
peripheral to their core concerns (della Porta, 2015) and vice versa (Goldstone, 2003). 
Social movements are seen as ‘challengers’ looking to gain access to institutionalised 
politics (Tilly, 1978), and even as parasitical upon the party system (Schattschneider, 
1948). More recently, however, some scholars have sought to emphasise the mutual 
dependencies and overlaps between parties and interest groups or movements 
(Goldstone, 2003). As ‘political organisations,’ for example they are both a form of 
political ‘linkage’ and should be considered as part of a common research agenda 
(Fraussen and Halpin, 2018). 
 
Strong relationships between parties and social movements are a long-standing 
feature of political organisation. Parties are gatekeepers to power and potential agents 
of change. They are therefore always likely to be potential targets for groups, 
organisations and movements that seek political change (Allern and Bale, 2012: 8). 
The particular form that these relationships take can vary: movements may create new 
parties (della Porta et al 2017), they may integrate with existing ones, or form looser, 
but close, associations. The strategy pursued depends, in part, on the particular 
dynamics of the party system concerned, as Cowell-Myers (2014) has argued. 
 
For example, social movements may, firstly, create or initiate parties. This may be 
strategic (to pursue power) or tactical (to achieve a specific campaigning goal). The 
Labour Party, which emerged in the twentieth century from trade unions’ efforts to 
promote and strengthen working class representation (in alliance with socialist and 
reformist societies), benefited from the expansion of the franchise and the collapse of 
the Liberal Party. More recently, left-libertarian and Green movements (Kitschelt, 
1988; Kitschelt, 1989) have emerged onto the formal political landscape, and in some 
cases, such as the German Greens, have become governing parties. These parties, 
whilst initially reflecting the social movement organisation from which they emerged, 
are likely, eventually, to become more formally routinised and institutionalised (Offe 
1990; Tarrow 1994; Koopmans 2004; van Biezen 2005), albeit retaining some of their 
previous identity (Kitschelt 2006). 
 
Similar assumptions underlie della Porta and colleagues’ analysis of a more recent 
wave of hybrid ‘movement parties’ in Europe, emerging in the wake of the 2008 
financial crash. Drawing on three case studies – SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in 
Spain, and Italy’s ‘Five Star Movement’ (M5S) – they conceptualise them as 
transitional organisations, beginning as anti-austerity and anti-establishment 
mobilisations, characterised by ‘shallow, weak, and opportunistic organization’ (della 
Porta et al., 2017: 15) and destined to become formalised political parties.  
 
New parties may also be formed as a campaigning tactic by social movements to 
influence more established parties. Cowell-Myers’ (2014) argues that the Northern 
Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) had a successful impact on patterns of 
representation in the province in this way. In a proportional electoral system, they 
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were able to gain enough of a voice to influence the political process and initiate a 
dynamic of ‘contagion’ (Duverger 1954), in which more dominant parties began to 
compete to adopt its agenda to improve the representation and participation of women 
in Northern Ireland politics. 
 
However, the dynamics of two-party majoritarian systems (Ware 2009) create 
significant barriers to the entry of new parties meaning other strategies may be more 
promising and plausible.  Thus, in these circumstances, it may make more sense for 
social movements to enter into integrated relationships with already existing political 
parties. There are broadly two different strategies by which such a state of affairs may 
come about. A party may deliberately cultivate relations of co-ordination with a 
movement (even eventually co-opting it wholesale), or a social movement may enter 
into a party as part of an invasive or hostile strategy (Schwartz, 2010), creating a 
movement-wing within the party. 
 
In the first of these scenarios, outlined comprehensively in the US context by 
Schlozman (2015), cooperation may be an especially attractive move in systems 
where ‘traditional political organisations have receded’ and the parties have been’ 
hollowed out’ (Schlozman, 2015: 22) becoming ‘more permeable and more dependent 
on outside groups’ (Schlozman, 2015: 27). Parties and movements form these kinds 
of relationships because there are mutual benefits. Key to this, he argues, is that 
internal elite gatekeepers see a path to victory and durable electoral majorities 
resulting from the arrangement. In an era of declining party membership rates (van 
Biezen et al., 2012), social movements could be seen as a source of revitalisation and 
renewal for political parties. 
 
However, Schlozman’s model focuses on a specific type of voluntary ‘anchoring’ 
relationship between parties and movements. He – quite explicitly – does not concern 
himself with hostile or aggressive strategies. But existing party leaders may not 
always have the decisive say as to what groups become involved in their organisation. 
Protest movements or other activist organisations may form new factions within the 
party or take over existing ones with the aim of attempting to take control of it. 
Schwartz (2006; 2010) focuses more specifically on this kind of relationship, in which 
movements begin outside of parties and work their way in. As well as the kind of 
collaborative approach outlined above, movements may adopt invasive strategies 
(involving ‘insurgency’ on behalf of an alternative ideology or leader, takeover or co-
optation), or hostile strategies (including disruption, discrediting opponents, purging). 
The Tea Party’s relationship with the US Republican Party could be characterised in 
this way (Williamson et al., 2011). 
 
Thirdly, social movements and political parties may associate closely, forming loose, 
overlapping connections to each other’s mutual benefit without seeking to integrate. 
Several mechanisms might link movements and ‘routine political actors,’ including 
the adoption of strategies, collective action repertoires and forms of movement 
organising (Szabo, 2015; Kruszewska, 2016; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010) by parties 
or by movements joining electoral coalitions or engaging in electoral mobilisation 
(McAdam and Tarrow, 2010: 533). These relationships may take the form of 
‘exchange relationships’: groups for instance may provide expertise in key policy 
areas, as well as information, resources and support which makes cooperation 
attractive to parties (Allern and Bale, 2012). An initial incentive for interaction is the 
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imperative of organisational survival and is more likely where there is a ‘certain 
degree of overlap … between the party and the social movements’ identities.’ (Piccio, 
2012: 268). What may emerge from this is a beneficial form of mutualism that arises 
from the fact that each has control over resources the other needs (Witko, 2009: 221), 
reinforced by the political environment, institutions and structures (Witko, 2009: 
227). This, in turn, fosters overlaps between party and movement personnel and the 
reinforcement of shared networks. Banaszak (2010) has highlighted (in the context of 
state-movement relations) the importance of the physical presence of activists both 
inside the institution (i.e. the party in this case), and outside (in wider movement 
networks), providing a basis on which the movement and party organisations can 
begin to work together. 
 
We build on and add to this literature, arguing that there is an emergent new 
dimension to the party-movement relationship in the form of the party-driven 
movement that has emerged within parties, whilst at the same time maintaining a 
distinctiveness from them. These movements differ from della Porta et al’s 
transitional ‘movement parties’, from Schlozman’s ‘anchoring relationships’, the 
hostile ‘invaders’ of Schwartz and from McAdam and Tarrow’s electoral coalitions. 
Nor are they quite adequately described, in our view, as ‘movement factions’ which 
resemble party-affiliated factions (Dennis 2019). They are characterised by 
integration on the one hand, and distinctiveness on the other. These, we argue, 
represent a variation in the relationship between movement and party which may have 
a longer-term impact on the evolution of the latter and which therefore requires its 
own explanation. In the next section, then, we introduce our two main case studies 
before going on to conceptualise party-driven movements. 
 
Party-Driven Movements: Case Studies 
 
Momentum 
 
Momentum was the brainchild of Jon Lansman, a long-standing left-wing Labour 
activist who had worked on Tony Benn’s deputy leadership campaign in 1981. Along 
with Adam Klug, Emma Rees and James Schneider as national co-ordinators, he 
launched the organisation in 2015 following Jeremy Corbyn’s victory in the party’s 
leadership ballot as a means of harnessing the political energy generated by his 
campaign. A key purpose of this new organisation was to build support for Corbyn’s 
policy agenda and a left-wing agenda more generally (Wintour, 2015). By 2018, 
Momentum reported that it had reached 40,000 members, with 15 members of staff, 
170 local groups and over 95% of its funding coming from membership fees and 
small donations (Cowburn, 2018). 
 
Our Revolution 
 
Our Revolution was founded in August 2016, a successor to the Bernie Sanders 
campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination and an attempt to continue to 
promote its agenda. It was established as a social welfare organisation (known as a 
‘501(c)(4)’) with its key objective to ‘transform American politics to make our 
political and economic systems once again responsive to the needs of working 
families’ (Gautney, 2017). The organisation’s staff and board of directors came 
largely from campaign organisers and volunteers. Key figures include Nina Turner 
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(President), a politician from Ohio who initially backed Clinton and then switched to 
Sanders in 2015, becoming ‘one of the most prominent black voices to stump for 
Sanders’ (Meyerson, 2017), and Larry Cohen (Chair), former President of 
Communication Workers of America who worked on his campaign as a liaison to 
organised labour. 
 
We employ these case studies as illustrative examples for a plausibility probe of our 
theory for the emergence of this type of hybrid organisation. We believe that these 
two case studies help to illustrate and to add substance to the theoretical framework 
we set out in this article on the basis of which more empirical testing could be done. 
 
 
Conditions of Emergence 
 
In the following analysis, we argue that four common elements shape the conditions 
under which these party-driven movements emerge: i) issues – that there are 
unarticulated or unrepresented claims that seek expression in the political system; ii) 
people – that there is a critical mass of potential supporters in pre-existing movements 
and organisations who can be galvanised behind those claims; iii) access – that 
opportunities exist to articulate and galvanise support behind those claims; iv) 
leadership – that there is a figure, and a campaign, around which different 
organisations, campaigns and actors can coalesce into a single movement. This 
structure draws from key ideas in political process theory for understanding the 
emergence of social movements – political opportunities, mobilising structures and 
framing processes – while seeking to highlight what is unique and distinctive about 
the particular situation of movements arising from within political parties in the 
context of two-party majoritarian systems. 
 
Issues: Unrepresented claims 
 
Kitschelt has argued that new parties are likely to emerge ‘only where an intensively 
felt, salient political interest harbored by a quantitatively significant constituency 
lacks representation in the existing party system’ (Kitschelt, 2006: 282). The 
domination in recent years of centre-left parties by ‘centrist’ leadership groups has 
meant that in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, more radical voices on the 
anti-austerity left have struggled to be heard in mainstream political debate, despite 
significant support. This opens a gap for alternatives to the mainstream parties. In 
Spain, for example, this was one of the factors behind the rise of Podemos (Ramiro 
and Gomez, 2016). However, as we have suggested, in majoritarian systems like the 
US and the UK, thresholds are high for the establishment of new parties. Therefore – 
where other conditions are satisfied (especially a relative organisational openness) – 
these unrepresented claims can form the basis of an appeal by radical campaigns and 
movements within the existing party system.  
 
In the UK, Corbyn supporters have been found by Paul Whiteley and colleagues to 
have been disenchanted with politics-as-usual and yearning for a new style of politics 
not represented by the former Labour leadership (Whiteley et al., 2019). Labour failed 
clearly to articulate an anti-austerity position, and consequently faced a challenge 
from a new coalition of internal and external left-wing forces united by an anti-
austerity outlook. In the leadership contest that followed electoral defeat in 2015, 
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Jeremy Corbyn articulated the frustration of many members and voters about the 
impact of government spending cuts conducted in the name of ‘austerity’ (Klug and 
Rees, 2018). Specific policies not being articulated by the Labour leadership at the 
time included renationalizing Britain’s railways, giving up its nuclear weapons, 
replacing the House of Lords with an elected chamber, cracking down on tax evasion 
and strengthening the power of trade unions. Tapping into pre-existing voter 
concerns, in combination with the right candidate, provides an ideological core 
around which a coherent, sustainable movement can emerge from within existing 
party structures. 
 
Supporters of Our Revolution in the US have mobilised around a wide range of 
issues. A survey of the dozens of affiliated local groups (Our Revolution 2019), 
indicates that whilst they tend to have a localised rather than national focus in their 
stated aims and objectives, they have coalesced around a number of significant 
common issues which underpin a national appeal and resonate with the Sanders 
policy platform. These include campaigning for the right to universal healthcare 
coverage, against global warming, for greater economic and social equality and 
against the excessive power of ‘corporate America’ (See for example Our Revolution, 
2019a; Progressive Democrats of America, 2019; Sacramento Progressive Alliance, 
2019; Cuyahoga County Progressive Caucus, 2019). The stated ambitions of these 
groups are to ‘spend our money on education and job creation rather than 
incarceration … (and) see that people have access to affordable health care from 
before birth to last breaths’ (Our Revolution, 2019b), to ‘raise awareness, educate, 
and mobilize our local communities in the fight against inequality in all its forms’ 
(Our Revolution, 2019c) and to reclaim ‘our government from the special interests 
and corporations that have overshadowed the voice of the people’ (Our Revolution, 
2019d). 
 
People: Pre-existing social movement networks 
 
For unrepresented claims and interests to enter into an existing political party, there 
needs to be some form of pre-existing organisation and network that is capable of 
doing so. Pre-existing movements, organisations and campaigns are a significant 
resource on which party organisations draw and, under the right conditions, will form 
the basis of new movement-party hybrids. Thus, there needs to be a large enough base 
of movement supporters willing to join the party. In centre-left parties in particular, 
left-wing factions appear most likely to form party-driven movements because of 
members’ traditionally strong links and familiarity with progressive social movements 
(Kriesi, 2015; Kriesi et al., 1995; della Porta, 1996). Key to this is the overlap 
between activists both inside and outside the party (Banaszak 2010), form networks 
that cut across the party’s boundaries. Both Momentum and Our Revolution have 
benefited from the activation and galvanisation of these networks. 
 
A significant contributor to Corbyn’s success was its appeal to anti-war, anti-austerity 
and anti-racism campaigners, students, and traditionally ‘outsider’ groups on the left 
which helped form the basis of Momentum (Klug and Rees, 2018; Earle, 2018), along 
with a range of Labour and former Labour members. As Jon Lansman explained:  
 
‘You had the pre-existing Labour left, which was tiny, of course. But they had 
influences. Then you had a left that was outside of the Labour Party but was 
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part of the traditional left. Stop the War was part of that. Then there were lots 
and lots of returners who had left at all sorts of times. People who had left in 
the 80s and the 90s and over the Iraq war were coming back. Then you had 
these people who were completely new to the Labour Party. Most of them had 
not been in other left parties, or if they had it was the Greens, and the social 
movements….’ (Ghadiali, 2018). 
 
Whiteley and colleagues observe that of the post-2015 recruits to the Labour Party, 
those who rejoined after their membership had lapsed tended to be more left-wing 
than current members, indicating that sections of the far left had rejoined the party 
(Whiteley et al., 2019).  
 
It is clear from the number of different groups working directly under the Our 
Revolution banner how this has acted as a rallying point for groups that had hitherto 
been outsiders. Long-standing radical and fringe campaigning groups like the 
Democratic Socialists of America, Progressive Democrats of America as well as a 
cornucopia of state and local organisations have cohered under the banner of Our 
Revolution, motivated by the core common concerns outlined above. Democratic 
Socialists are ‘inspired by Bernie’s call for a political revolution’ (Our Revolution, 
2019e). Campaigns like the Democracy Project in Los Angeles see participation in 
Our Revolution as part of their mission to ‘unite Democrats, Green Party, Democratic 
Socialists and Independents behind liberal causes, legislation and candidates.’ (Our 
Revolution, 2019f). Other groups are ‘bringing together a coalition of (local) 
progressives … from all the various communities who support progressive change’ 
(Our Revolution, 2019g) and seeking to ‘act as an intermediary between groups, 
uniting specialty organizations … into a more cohesive movement’ (Our Revolution, 
2019h). In California, for example, ‘local grassroots volunteers, activists, and leaders’ 
have come together under the Our Revolution banner ‘to fight for issues and values 
that are critical in our community’ (Our Revolution, 2019i). 
 
Access: Political Opportunity Structures 
 
The high thresholds for new parties in two-party majoritarian systems, means success 
for Our Revolution and Momentum was more likely to come by exploiting 
opportunities to influence and transform dominant parties from within. In the United 
States, weak party organisation provided this opportunity. The Democratic Party, for 
instance, is characterised by some as merely a series of ‘state-run ballot lines’ over 
which leaders have no control (Schulman, 2016: 2). This means that radical political 
organisations such as the Democratic Socialists of America are likely to have a 
greater electoral impact by fielding or supporting candidates within the Democratic 
Party’s primary system (Democratic Socialists of America, 2019), than by running as 
an independent party. There is a long history of this potentially fruitful strategy 
(Schlozman, 2015), and the same kind of calculation was significant in Bernie 
Sanders’ decision to run for the Democratic nomination rather than as an independent 
Presidential candidate (Nader, 2016). 
 
In the UK’s parliamentary system, however, such a move by a party outsider would 
be impossible. According to party rules, Labour’s leader (and thus candidate for 
Prime Minister) must be ‘elected or re-elected from among Commons members of the 
PLP [Parliamentary Labour Party]’ (Labour Party, 2018: 4). However, Corbyn’s 
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leadership bid was facilitated by the relative openness of the party’s new leadership 
election procedure, established in 2014. It gave the franchise to a new category of 
‘Registered Supporters’ – non-members declaring support for party values and paying 
a small administration fee, set at £3 (Wintour, 2015b). Although nowhere near as 
open as a Democratic primary, this was nonetheless a major factor encouraging the 
flowering of a new movement around Corbyn’s non-mainstream candidacy because it 
enabled many thousands of non-members to sign up specifically in order to vote for 
him.1 Jeremy Corbyn won with a landslide victory on 12 September 2015 with 59.5% 
of the vote (215,417). 
 
In both these cases, party election rules created an opportunity to draw in support 
from beyond the existing party boundaries. This supports and extends the physical 
presence of activists both inside and outside the party boundaries which is necessary 
to addressing the claims of these new movements. One final factor, however, is 
necessary to draw all of this together: a leader. 
 
Leadership 
 
Crucial in each case was a unifying figure – Corbyn and Sanders respectively – 
around which these movements could coalesce. Neither were conventional leadership 
figures (both were considered ‘outsiders’), but the right kind of leader in the 
circumstances, representing an opportunity for a change of direction and an anti-elitist 
appeal.  
 
Corbyn was the most rebellious of Labour backbenchers over many years and was 
consistently at odds with the party leadership on a variety of issues (Cowley, 2005: 
49-53), whilst Sanders had made a career out of not being a Democrat (despite 
caucusing with them in the Senate). This assisted with the appeal of both candidates 
to non-party activists on the left and succeeded in attracting many of them into their 
respective parties. Corbyn, for instance, was perhaps uniquely able to bring together 
anti-austerity, anti-war, Labour, non-Labour and ex-Labour leftists in addition to new 
waves of enthusiasts (Ghadiali, 2018). Combined with the opening-up of Labour’s 
leadership election, this enabled thousands of new members and supporters to support 
his campaign (Poletti et al., 2016). Out of this movement, Momentum was born.  
 
Many Our Revolution groups are explicit about the fact that they are ‘a spin-off of the 
Bernie Sanders campaign’ (Our Revolution, 2019j), ‘inspired by Bernie Sanders’ 
(Our Revolution, 2019k), and ‘dedicated to the continuation of the revolution that 
Bernie Sanders ignited in us’ (NYPAN, Southern Finger Lakes, 2019). As such they 
are ‘inspired by Bernie Sanders’ vision’ (Our Revolution, 2019) and ‘abide by (his) 
… principles’ (Our Revolution, 2019m). 
 
Whilst clearly anti-elitist in tone, does this amount to a populist appeal? It was 
certainly popular, particularly in Corbyn’s case, and both individuals were in some 
sense important embodiments of the movements that have respectively coalesced 
 
1 Corbyn only reached the nomination threshold (15 percent of MPs) with help from non-supporters 
who nonetheless believed his anti-austerity position should be represented in the contest (Wintour 
2015a). 
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around them. One difficulty is that ‘populism’ is a sometimes vague and often 
misused term. Cas Mudde, usefully defines it as: 
 
‘a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of 
the people’ (Mudde 2004 cited in Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 
149-50) 
 
Whilst there may have been some element of this in their appeal, it would be difficult 
to argue that either Corbyn’s or Sanders’ platforms were based solely on such a naked 
appeal to unbridled ‘populism’. In both cases, their political ideologies could be 
described as a more fully developed form of social democracy (or democratic 
socialism as Corbyn describes himself) rather than the more ‘thin’ and malleable form 
of populism.  On the other hand, if we switch attention to the specific intra-party 
appeal, this may yield slightly different answers. Watts and Bale (2019) have argued 
that Corbyn’s appeal amounted to a kind of ‘intra-party populism’ serving as a 
‘corrective’ to a party democracy that had stopped serving its members, and appealing 
to their wisdom against a corrupt and misguided elite. One of Corbyn’s objectives 
was to reform internal party democracy to make Labour more of a member-led 
organisation. 
 
Whilst this may be open to debate, more important arguably is that both Sanders’ and 
Corbyn’s campaigns, could be characterised in Schwartz’s (2010) terminology by co-
ordinated interaction between internal party actors and external movements. More 
important than an appeal to existing party members alone, was a capacity to draw new 
people in (as discussed above). However, this is qualified by the fact that existing 
senior leadership figures did not play a significant role. Indeed, their attitude was at 
different times complacent, indifferent, hostile and bewildered. The co-ordination that 
was taking place in these cases was (initially) between apparently marginal actors: the 
radical fringes of the party and left-wing groups outside its formal boundaries. In this 
respect, then, their campaigns additionally demonstrated some characteristics of 
insurgency, and even hostile takeover, which perhaps adds some credence to the intra-
party populism argument. Whether we would call it populist or not, leadership of 
these movements came from marginal figures whose reputation and appeal was based 
on their status as long-standing outsiders running against the existing hierarchy.  
 
 
Key Characteristics 
 
Party-driven movements can be identified by four key characteristics.  Three reflect a 
kind of ambivalent ‘Janus’ strategy which seeks to engage with and influence, if not 
control, the direction of the party by getting into positions which make it possible to 
marshal its considerable resources in favour of its preferred priorities. At the same 
time, the party benefits from the resources the movement brings, especially 
committed, engaged activists. This reflects the fourth characteristic, a specific 
movement-style of organising which is mostly digitally based, and which acts 
independently of the party itself, whilst being closely aligned with it.   
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Insider/outsider status 
 
A traditional characteristic of formal organisations like mainstream parties is clearly 
maintained ‘formal’ boundaries – for example, by means of a membership scheme – 
as well as ‘informal’ ones marked out by shared language and practice (Rye, 2015: 
303-304). Party-driven movements do not conform to such clear demarcations. They 
are characterised by an ambivalent relationship with the party itself, operating within 
it while seeking to maintain an ‘outsider’ status (Selfa, 2008).  
 
This, in part, reflects the ambiguities of their origins in networks operating across the 
party’s internal and external fringes. But it also reflects a suspicion of mainstream 
party-politics and demonstrates the potential for a clash of organisational cultures. 
Party-driven movements adopt from social movements a more horizontal structure 
which contrasts with traditional, often hierarchical or (in Labour’s case) federal forms 
of party organisation adding to the semi-detached relationship between the two. 
 
At the same time, there are good, strategic reasons for this ‘Janus’ strategy that 
recognise the limits of extra-parliamentary action. Momentum founding national 
organisers, Adam Klug and Emma Rees (2018), for instance, advise progressives to 
‘take the movement into the party’ because it is likely to be a more effective strategy. 
They point out that even the most heavily supported protest can be ineffective on its 
own: for example the anti-Iraq War protests in February 2003 (which organisers 
estimated 1.5 million attended) failed to stop the UK’s involvement in the war (Klug 
and Rees, 2018). They argue instead for an ‘insider-outsider strategy, linking 
movements and the party to create a movement-party’ (Klug and Rees, 2018). The 
aim is to connect vibrant movements with an organisational structure capable of 
influencing political decision-making at a governmental level. They argue for the 
strong benefits of a strategy which maintains a significant level of autonomy from the 
party in an independent organisation, since it enables the movement to act as an 
independent voice within it. 
 
Some might argue that this is an attempt by movements to have it both ways, riding 
on an anti-politics wave as ‘outsiders’ but for relatively conventional political 
purposes (Dennis, 2019: 7). However, it also reflects a wider ambivalence on the left 
towards electoral politics. The attempt to straddle both worlds in the case of Our 
Revolution is a response to the ‘classic dilemma’ of American radical politics: 
whether to struggle within the Democratic Party or create an alternative to it 
(Uetricht, 2017: 26). Sanders has sought to strike a balance between these strategies: 
his detachment from the Democratic Party means he has not been subject to the same 
compromises as other potential candidates, even as he has worked and caucused with 
Democrats in the Senate for many years.  
 
For many radicals, the Sanders campaign was a vehicle for the outsider left to ‘be in 
the room’ (Lenchner, 2015: 64). It provided ‘an opening for grassroots energy’ and 
exploited a ‘vibrant and open membrane between anti-capitalism and Democratic 
politics’ (Lenchner, 2015: 65). Even amongst his critics on the left, there is a 
recognition that Sanders ‘would not have reached this vast audience if he hadn’t run 
in the Democratic primary’ (Serge, 2016). Our Revolution is a product of this 
approach – it is both seeking to change the Democratic Party from within and agitate 
from without (Uetricht, 2017). Even after the defeat of Sanders’ presidential 
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nomination in 2016, activists continued to mobilise through Our Revolution due to the 
popularity and perceived success of this form of organising. Although they lost the 
nomination, Sanders performed much better than expected and activists saw this as 
the beginning rather than the end of their campaign. This was an opportunity for a 
range of oppressed and marginalised social groups to articulate their grievances 
through a transformative program without losing their group specificity (Young, 
1990). 
 
There is a mutual benefit to party and movement cooperation. The movement 
provides the party with fresh energy and new members, whilst the party provides the 
structure for the movement to make further political advances. However, there is an 
ever-present danger in such strategies of co-option or absorption (Schlozman, 2015), 
and for many on the radical left in the US, collaboration with it is at best a temporary 
measure, providing a platform for an independent left wing party (Finger, 2015; 
Schulman, 2015; Meyer, 2016), and at worst a betrayal, binding activists to a neo-
liberal party (Smith and Selfa, 2016). With this in mind, the Our Revolution Group in 
Casper, Wyoming warns that its existence ‘represents the seeds of that potential third 
party and also presents a cautionary tale to the Democratic Party of the critical 
importance of returning to its New Deal populist, progressive roots’ (Our Revolution, 
2019n), which suggests that the longer-term maintenance of this coalition is highly 
contingent. 
 
Agenda: reforming the party and transforming society 
 
Ostensibly, this ambivalent ‘Janus’ strategy is manifested further in an apparent 
tension between two types of goal: reforming the party on the one hand and 
transforming society on the other. In the former case, party-driven movements seek to 
strengthen support for particular policy platforms or ideological positions within the 
party. They may act as internal pressure groups, pushing for policy change, for 
example to expand government investment in public services, state supported health 
care and higher education, redistribution of wealth or the public control of key 
services or industries, as both Momentum and Our Revolution do (Momentum, 
2018a; Sanders, 2016). This reflects the priorities of new movement-inspired 
members who tend to be more politically radical than mainstream party members 
(Poletti et al., 2016). 
 
However, seeking to reform internal party bodies for instance, whilst an inward-
facing activity, does not necessarily contradict or undermine these activities. Indeed, 
such a strategy is rooted in the recognition that significant social change is only 
possible with a radical government supported and patrolled by a powerful social base 
of mobilised citizens. From this point-of-view, the process of transforming parties and 
their personnel is an important first step to achieving more ambitious political goals. 
These movements need to struggle over resources available within the party in order 
to gain more power to implement their programs. In short, if the party is to be a tool 
for transforming society it is crucial to first transform the party.  
 
In 2017, Labour launched a ‘Democracy Review’ with the aim of altering its structure 
and rules to make it ‘a more open, democratic, member-led party that’s ready to win 
elections’ (British Labour Party, 2018; Momentum, 2018a), including a membership 
system ‘opened up to include supporters of other movements’ (Momentum, 2018a). 
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This was based on the observation that making the party more internally democratic 
and broadly-based would end Labour’s ‘severance from a significant chunk of its 
social base’ and enable it to reconnect to the electorate (Savage, 2016). Democratic 
reform and greater openness, it was hoped, would encourage mass participation and 
enable the mobilisation needed to build political power and win elections. Such 
reforms are often contentious, and many of the key proposals for party reform were 
put on hold for a year at the party’s 2018 National Conference (Stewart and Elgot, 
2018). 
 
Similarly, Our Revolution – as part of its Transform the Party agenda – is ‘attempting 
to effect a transformation of the party’ through a ‘major realignment’ towards a ‘more 
pro-worker agenda’ (Uetricht, 2017: 21-22). This requires a fundamental change in 
the party structure and rules as Larry Cohen (Chair of Our Revolution Board of 
Directors) has argued: ‘a key part of the work of changing Democrats for the better 
involves changing the governance of the party itself’ and building ‘a network of 
decentralised, place-based political organisations’ in its place (Aranoff, 2018: 3). ‘Big 
organising’ techniques have been adopted to build a grassroots campaign which relies 
on small donor fundraising rather than big corporate donations (Bond and Exley, 
2016). 
 
A potential barrier to this strategy is the organisational traditions and strength of the 
party concerned. Democratic Party organisation is notably weak, as discussed, which 
leaves it relatively open to well-organised movements and thus to change. However, 
Labour’s is much stronger and traditionally based on the representation of key 
internal constituencies of interest, including trade unions, constituency parties and 
elected representatives. The relatively horizontal, direct democratic nature of social 
movement organisation is a significant challenge to these traditions and such moves 
inevitably come up against resistance from forces in the party, including trade unions, 
who wish to protect them. This may, as in Labour’s case, reflect historical experience 
of hostile entryism by outside groups (see Shaw 1988), which makes change more 
complex.   
 
Another element of its strategy is to get sympathetic candidates elected to office. As 
part of the organising efforts of Our Revolution, 46 democratic socialist candidates 
won primaries in 2018 (Democratic Socialists of America 2018). Their campaign 
succeeded in shifting perceptions about ‘socialism’ especially amongst younger 
voters. Thus, Our Revolution ‘engages in local party building and running progressive 
candidates’ (Gautney, 2017), for everything from seats on education boards and state 
senates to gubernatorial and mayoral races. This is a significant strategy of many local 
groups (e.g. Our Revolution New Mexico, 2019; Our Revolution Northern Virginia, 
2019; Our Revolution Oklahoma, 2019). 
 
One important tactic for Our Revolution has been taking over party organisations at 
the state level. In California for example, activists have attempted to ‘aggressively 
push one of the country’s most progressive states into playing a vanguard role’ 
(Uetricht, 2017: 25) through organising and mobilising in internal party elections 
(normally unremarkable, low-profile affairs). These forms of organising have also 
occurred in Washington State, Hawaii, Nebraska, Florida where mobilised local 
groups and campaigning organisations have challenged mainstream Democrats 
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Independence/autonomy 
 
The relationship between the political party and a party-driven movement is an 
unusual one. Whilst the latter seeks to change the former from within, as we have 
outlined, it also tries to maintain autonomy from it. This distinguishes it very clearly 
from a mere faction. Rather than organising within the party as a sub-unit, party-
driven movements exist as distinct, legally constituted organisations in their own 
right. As such, they are vulnerable to accusations of ‘entryism’. Momentum, for 
instance, have been accused it of being a ‘party within a party,’ aiming at a hostile 
take-over. 
 
These concerns are not surprising given Labour’s history and the movement’s 
positioning of itself on the boundary between the Labour Party and a non-Labour left, 
historically sceptical of the party itself, but attracted by Corbyn’s agenda and 
galvanised by his campaign. The Registered Supporters scheme, as outlined above, 
made it straightforward for such individuals to participate in the leadership contest. 
Since then, Momentum has reformed its membership rules in an attempt to get around 
entryism fears. Since January 2017, Momentum members must also be party members 
(Cowburn, 2017; Momentum, 2017a), which has arguably eroded its independence. 
 
What remains key to Momentum’s independence is that the organisation retains its 
own organising structures and (notably complex) ownership arrangements (Ball and 
Le Conte, 2016). Momentum’s independent decision-making capacity is formally 
governed by a National Coordinating Group ‘which includes representatives of 
members, affiliates and Labour public office holders, as well as being elected 
ordinary members through a digital democracy process’ (Momentum, 2017a), but it 
has some unusual features for an apparently member-led organisation: 
 
‘Momentum may look and act like a grassroots organisation … it’s 
actually that most capitalist of things, a private company, the successor to 
“Jeremy Corbyn Campaign 2015 (Supporters) Limited” … with one 
director, Jon Lansman’ (Cadwalladr, 2016). 
 
Such an organisational structure has allowed Momentum to hold on to its own contact 
lists and run its own social media campaigns through its members and supporters. 
 
Many Our Revolution groups use language which explicitly emphasises their 
independence and their progressive commitment. Groups describe themselves as ‘a 
nonpartisan progressive organization’ (Our Revolution, 2019d) ‘trans-partisan’ (Our 
Revolution Lane County, 2019), a ‘bipartisan grassroots movement’ (Our Revolution, 
2019p) ‘a non-partisan political action group’ (Our Revolution, 2019q) ‘a multi-
partisan network’ (Washington Berniecrats Coalition, 2019). The independence of an 
organisation like Our Revolution is looked upon as important by sympathisers for the 
simple reason that ‘grassroots driven organisations must be aligned with their 
supporters and donors or they will not be able to accomplish their goals’ (Lenchner, 
2015: 66). Maintaining some level of independence is vital for turning Sanders’ 
support into ‘the organisational strength necessary to realise’ a left-wing program to 
transform society (Fertik, 2016: 47). It certainly has the hallmarks of an independent 
organisation: with its own board, its status as a non-profit and its own staff ‘made up 
of veterans and volunteers of the Bernie 2016 campaign and movement’ (Our 
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Revolution, 2019r). It has its own network of organisations – there are 500 registered 
groups around the United States – focused on organising in particular localities and 
communities around issues of concern to them (such as rent controls, use of public 
space and housing foreclosures). Our Revolution also maintains links to external 
organisations with similar goals in an attempt to enact a kind of ‘tea party of the left’ 
seeking to reimagine the practice of politics itself on less traditionally partisan lines 
(Aranoff, 2018: 8). 
 
Nonetheless, Our Revolution’s strategy has included working closely with and within 
the Democratic Party, providing endorsement and support for Democratic candidates 
in elections at various levels, although only those signed up to its aims and values 
(Aranoff, 2018). This, for some, is problematic. Even if justified as the only viable 
way of sustaining left-wing electoral campaigns (especially presidential ones), some 
activists assert that the goal must be a completely separate movement, to obviate the 
risk of absorption or diversion (see above). For them, the desire of left movements to 
attach themselves to the Democratic Party is historically ‘the main explanation for its 
failure to build a sustained mass political alternative’ and is a reason why some are 
wary of Our Revolution’s strategy (Smith and Selfa, 2016: 4). 
 
However, as others on the left have pointed out, the Democratic Party to all intents 
and purposes has no organisation to speak of, at least not in the European sense 
(Hirsch, 2007; Fertik, 2016; Schulman, 2016) which is in itself a strong reason, some 
would argue, for seeking to build a movement within it (Aranoff, 2018). The greater 
permeability and looseness of US party organisation means that independents and 
non-Democrats on the left (like Sanders himself) can easily enter into Democratic 
races anyway, much easier than it would be in the Labour Party for example. This 
makes it possible for a well-organised independent movement to maintain a distinct 
identity whilst working within a well-established party. In any case, Nina Turner, Our 
Revolution’s President, claimed in a 2017 interview that working with groups and 
candidates outside the Democratic Party structures should not be ruled out either: 
 
‘Let’s put the political affiliation to the side. If there is a Republican or a 
Libertarian or Green … that believes in Medicare for all, then that’s our 
kind of person. If there’s somebody that believes that Citizens United 
needs to be overturned, that we need the 28th amendment to the 
Constitution that declares that money, corporate money, is not speech 
and that corporations should not have more speech than Mrs. Johnson 
down the street and Mr. Gonzalez around the corner, then that’s our kind 
of people.’ (Meyerson, 2017). 
 
Whilst the lack of formal organisation means it is relatively easy to promote favoured 
candidates from outside the Democratic mainstream, it makes holding representatives 
to account once they have been elected much more difficult (Aranoff, 2018). How to 
ensure those who have benefited from the movement’s support remain faithful to its 
goals, then, is a significant problem. 
 
Digital Organising 
 
Finally, essential to the capacity of movements like Our Revolution and Momentum 
to organise independently is social media and other inexpensive, usually web-based, 
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organising tools. Digital technology is central to the way in which party-led 
movements have developed, helping to foster a ‘party-as-movement mentality’ 
(Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016). Groups like Momentum and Our Revolution 
have brought these tools and mentality with them into the party arena, and used them 
to perform classic party functions like canvassing. In short, they are ‘doing electoral 
politics differently’ (Dennis, 2019: 5), bringing new approaches and techniques to the 
process rather than radically challenging the underlying strategy to win elections. The 
Bernie Sanders campaign and its subsequent movement benefited from this 
(Lenchner, 2016: 66). Indeed, key figures in Sanders’ campaign argue that it was 
central to the ‘radical trust and community building’ that was at the centre of a 
campaign designed ‘to get as many people involved as possible’ (Bond and Exley, 
2016: 92). 
 
Momentum members were more likely than regular party members to be politically 
active on social media and to attend public meetings (Poletti et al., 2016). Emulating 
organisations like 38 Degrees, online tools are part of the organisational infrastructure 
(Chadwick and Dennis, 2016), enabling members to initiate and vote on campaigns, 
propose constitutional amendments and challenge decisions made by the National 
Coordinating Group (Momentum, 2017a). Online organising has also supported 
effective campaigning: during the 2017 general election, Momentum launched ‘My 
Nearest Marginal’ App to help activists prioritise their campaigning, offer lifts or car 
shares and devote efforts to marginal seats (Dommett and Temple, 2018). It was used 
by over 100,000 people to locate battleground seats in order to campaign more 
effectively (The Week, 2017).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have identified the party-driven movement as a distinct and 
potentially enduring organisational feature of the party landscape. Their emergence, 
in response to unrepresented claims or grievances, is made possible by overlapping 
networks between party and external movements representing those claims and the 
opportunities provided for these to coalesce within the party itself. In both cases, a 
unifying figure around which these movements and people can coalesce is important. 
 
The effect of this has brought about changes to culture and organisation within US 
and UK parties that may yet prove to be relatively stable, but there are also tensions 
brought about by the movement’s ‘Janus strategy’, which raises issues that must be 
resolved if this is to represent an enduring form of organisation.  Are these new 
movements ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the party and ‘conventional’ politics? What should be 
the focus of their strategy? And to what extent are they simply a part of the party or 
independent from it? There are significant differences between the US and UK party 
systems which makes it unlikely that they will have precisely the same form or effect. 
Nonetheless, they open up the possibility of an emergent hybrid organisational form 
fusing movement and party, with overlapping membership and close organisational 
and environmental connections between its two components (Tarrow, 2015; della 
Porta et al., 2017).  
 
The systemic context is clearly an important factor here. The examples we have used 
in this analysis are majoritarian, two-party systems. The dynamics of these systems 
are such that the possibilities of success for new parties are limited. Instead, 
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movements need to attempt to influence or control the existing parties. This raises the 
question of whether party-driven movements are more likely to be limited to two-
party systems and whether they could thrive in other settings. If so, what other forms 
might such movements take? Whilst both our case studies reflect left-wing social 
movement politics, similar instances could also be studied from right-wing party-
driven movements. For example, the Tea Party’s relationship with the US Republican 
Party could arguably be characterised in a similar way. We might also ask to what 
extent UKIPs success up to 2016 could be ascribed to its strong associations with a 
broader (anti-EU) movement which is now being fought over by the Conservatives 
and the new Brexit Party. 
 
Such movements are also likely to face challenges that follow from their ambiguous 
status and contentious political role. First, a distinctive feature of party-driven 
movements is their ‘insider/outsider’ status which comes from an imperative to retain 
independence from the party whilst also operating within it. Such a precarious 
balancing act is difficult to maintain, and it is likely that movements will have to 
make tough choices between the two as they balance competing priorities. The risk on 
the one hand is in becoming detached from their movement origins and political base, 
or even completely absorbed by the party, thus losing their radical, outsider status. 
The party may be transformed by the movement, but the energy and participation it 
generated is lost. On the other hand, if in maintaining distance from the party 
mainstream, they lose the capacity to change the status quo they may become 
marginalised and impotent with similar outcomes. This is a significant challenge, 
closely related to an age old dilemma for democratic political parties, particularly of 
the left: how far to pursue the goal of power and risk breaking faith with their purpose 
and values.  
 
Whether such movements can maintain this strategy or not is significant to the kind of 
long-term effect, if any, they are likely to have on parties and the party system more 
generally. Whilst some of the innovations and changes that these movements have 
brought with them are well-established and could well be here to stay, we can only 
speculate on whether this foreshadows more radical developments or is merely a 
chapter in the slow evolution of parties as they adapt to the changing societies they 
seek to govern. 
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